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There is now extensive evidence to support
James J. Gibson’s (1966, 1979) hypothe-
sis that our perception of the environment
is scaled in terms of our ability to act on
that environment; by its affordances. One
strand of evidence comes from Proffitt,
who has shown that changing a person’s
ability to act affects how they judge their
ability to perform an upcoming task. The
most famous example (Bhalla and Proffitt,
1999) showed that people judge hills to
be steeper when they are wearing a heavy
backpack. The hypothesis is that the back-
pack would increase the effort required to
climb the hill, and thus we perceive the hill
as more difficult to climb (see Proffitt and
Linkenauger, 2013 for a recent review).
Soliman et al. (2013) applied Proffitt’s
particular sensorimotor mechanism to a
cultural context. They asked participants
to judge the distances between themselves
and in- or out-group members. The logic
is as follows:
(1) Interacting with someone requires
you to (unconsciously) mentally sim-
ulate things they do
(2) We do this simulation ahead of time,
in anticipation of an encounter
(3) This simulation will require more
effort with out-group members,
because they do things differently to
you
(4) This increased simulation effort will
affect your judgment of distance, as
per Proffitt
(5) Therefore out-group members should
look further away
The results seem promising; for example,
American and Arab participants who rated
themselves with an interdependent self-
construal did rate their in-group members
as closer than did participants with an
independent self-construal. Soliman et al.
argue that these results support an anal-
ysis of culture within Proffitt’s embodied
framework, which would be interesting if
true because it would let us talk about
both perceptual and cultural effects within
a unified framework.
There is a major problem, however.
Proffitt’s research very clearly shows that
increasing the effort required to perform
a task only affects distance perception
related to that task. For example, mak-
ing walking harder by fatiguing the legs
increases the perceived distance if you
plan to cross it by walking, but not if
you plan to cross it by throwing (Witt
et al., 2010). Soliman et al., however,
claim that the increased effort of inter-
nally simulating the movements required
to interact with an out-group member will
increase the perceived distance to that per-
son when that distance is to be traversed
by locomotion. Their effort manipula-
tion has nothing to do with locomoting
across the distance and thus, contrary to
the framing of their paper, their results
are neither predicted by nor explained
by reference to Proffitt’s action-scaling
theory.
Task specificity is central to Proffitt’s
theory. In a recent debate, Firestone (2013)
highlighted this because he believes this
creates a problem for Proffitt; if distance
perception for walking and throwing are
calibrated to different scales, you cannot
compare the two in order to choose the
best way to cross that distance. Proffitt
(2013) disagreed that this creates a prob-
lem but completely agreed that action-
specific units are incommensurable in this
way. He stated “An important finding
across our studies is that the influence of
an action unit—such as graspability—is
evident only within its action boundary”
(p. 477). This exchange is relevant because
Proffitt is specifically challenged here on
this point and comes out strongly and
unambiguously in favor of task-specificity.
Soliman et al. rest their non-task-
specific analysis on one paper (Schnall
et al., 2008). Participants in this study
judged hills as less steep when accom-
panied by or thinking about a friend.
The claim here is that social support
makes the hill appear more easily tra-
versed, without any apparent recalibration
of task-relevant effectors. Soliman et al.
argue that this supports their hypothesis
that an increase in upcoming social effort
www.frontiersin.org April 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 302 | 1
Wilson Action scaling is task specific
(the hypothesized prospective internal
simulation of the other person described
in points 1–3 above) could alter distance
perception. However, it is worth noting
that Schnall et al. specifically caution that
“it is too early to speculate on the degree
to which these influences [the effects of
physical vs. psychological states on slant
judgments] share common underlying
mechanisms or on what these mecha-
nisms might be” (p. 1254). In addition,
when we place this single result in the
context of the rest of Proffitt’s extensive
body of work repeatedly demonstrating
strong task specificity, it actually seems
more likely right now that the only way
in which a friend could help make a
hill look more climbable is by doing
something that recalibrates the embod-
ied hill-climbing system. Discovering
what this something is would be an
invaluable contribution to the unification
Soliman et al. propose, but it remains to
be done.
SUMMARY
Soliman et al. (2013) claim that the
increased mental effort required to simu-
late an upcoming encounter with an out-
group member will make the distance to
that person look more difficult to cross
and thus the person will look farther away.
They ground this hypothesis in Proffitt’s
embodied action-scaling theory of percep-
tion, but Proffitt’s data supports a strong
form of task-specificity that means his the-
ory neither predicts nor explains the cur-
rent results.
The current data (plus Schnall et al.,
2008) may eventually motivate a less
task-specific version of Proffitt’s mech-
anism. For example, the interaction of
self-construal with distance Soliman et al.
find is consistent with the claim that the
interdependent and independent groups
are evaluating the distances using differ-
ent metrics (see p. 4–5). But whether those
metrics are effort based (overturning the
otherwise extensive evidence in favor of
task-specificity) remains to be confirmed.
I am personally all in favor of an
embodied approach to unifying psychol-
ogy, but as I have argued (Wilson and
Golonka, 2013) this will require careful
attention to the details of the relevant
sensorimotor (perception-action) mecha-
nisms so that we are sure we are connect-
ing them to “higher level” cognition in
ways that reflect how those mechanisms
actually operate. This connection is sim-
ply not present in the target article, and
the implication for Soliman et al. is that
their data do not support their particular
attempt to unify psychology with sensori-
motor mechanisms.
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